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International justice and the reform of global
governance: a reconsideration of Michael
Walzer’s international political theory
PETER SUTCH*
Abstract. Walzer has recently updated his just war theory to take account of terrorism,
humanitarian military intervention and new interpretations of the doctrine of self-defence,
pre-emptive and preventative warfare The ethical considerations that underwrite Walzer’s
most recent work invite us beyond the routine citation of his work to a proper consideration
of the moral parameters of international politics. Beyond Just and Unjust Wars Walzer has
a wealth of insight into the key questions of international theory. His work on toleration,
the nature of universality or on the role of social criticism has always been the basis of his
insight in to the hard questions of international ethics. Despite being heavily criticised for
being communitarian or conservative (both charges that need serious re-evaluation) Walzer’s
ideas oﬀer a real alternative to the dominant neo-Kantian cosmopolitan tradition and a
workable ethical framework for thinking about the challenges of contemporary international
politics and international law. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the final essay of
Arguing About War. The essay, entitled ‘Governing the Globe’ oﬀers a radical vision of a
reformed international society inspired by the principles that underpin Walzer’s development
of his just war theory and it is vital that we take notice.
Introduction
Michael Walzer’s place in the pantheon of contemporary IR theory is assured. His
name is a byword for just war theory. To cite Just and Unjust Wars is to confer
authority upon an article or statement on the ethics of military force. What else is
there to say?
This rather neat view of Walzer’s theoretical contribution to international
political theory is so dominant that scholars have either stopped reading Walzer
altogether or have decided to ignore his more recent writing on international justice
because it does not gel with his established reputation. But Walzer’s more recent
work challenges this complacency. In many recent articles and lectures, and
* I would like to thank all those who contributed to the development of this article including
participants at the thin universalism workshop at Cardiﬀ and particularly to Peri Roberts, Bruce
Haddock, David Boucher and Rex Martin. Sincere thanks to the readers for the Review of
International Studies whose generous and thoughtful comments played a significant role in the
development of my argument.
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particularly in the 2004 Arguing about War,1 Walzer has re-examined his position.
He has developed the traditional principles of jus in bello and jus ad bellum in the
light of terrorism, humanitarian military intervention and new interpretations of
the doctrine of self-defence, pre-emptive and preventative warfare. This
re-examination, while fascinating and far-reaching, is far more than the application
of old principles to new problems and has led Walzer (and must lead us) to return
to the broader questions of international justice that have always underpinned his
work.
One particularly clear indicator of Walzer’s position is to be found in the
introductions to that staple of IR theory Just and Unjust Wars. The Third edition
of this classic text in 2000, written nearly quarter of a century after the work was
first published, bemoans the fact that so little has changed in world politics that
the text is a relevant as it ever was. By the time of the fourth edition in 2006, the
introduction is startlingly new. Not only must we think about regime change and
jus post bellum occupation (trusteeships and protectorates) but the category jus ad
bellum needs to be extended to jus ad vim (or the just use of force short of war).2
The ethical considerations that underwrite Walzer’s newer account of just war
theory invite us beyond the mere citation of his work to a proper consideration of
the moral parameters of international politics. Beyond Just and Unjust Wars
Walzer has a wealth of insight into the key questions of contemporary political
theory. His work on toleration, the nature of universality or on the role of social
criticism has always been the basis of his insight in to the hard questions of
international ethics. Despite being heavily criticised for being communitarian or
conservative (both charges that must be re-assessed in the light of recent work if
we are truly to benefit from Walzer’s insights) Walzer’s ideas oﬀer a real alternative
to the dominant neo-Kantian cosmopolitan tradition and a framework for thinking
about the challenges of contemporary international politics and international law.
Nowhere is this more apparent than in the final essay of Arguing About War. The
essay, entitled ‘Governing the Globe’ has was the subject of Walzer’s Multatuli
lecture at Leuven in 1999, it appeared in various forms in Dissent Magazine and
in Ethical Perspectives, it was the subject of a series of presentations and occasional
lectures and, I argue in the remainder of this article, it oﬀers a radical vision of a
reformed international society inspired by the principles that underpin Walzer’s
development of his just war theory.3 This piece of work has been around for a
considerable time but has not really penetrated the collective psyche of those who
routinely refer to Walzer’s oeuvre either as inspiration or for the purposes of
critique. Here I wish to present the core elements of that essay to make two
arguments. Firstly, I argue that we urgently need to reassess the contemporary
message of Walzer’s IR theory as the image of Walzer the conservative just war
theorist no longer withstands scholarly attention. Secondly, I argue that having
1 M. Walzer, Arguing About War (Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2004).
2 M. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (Basic Books,
2006). See also M. Walzer ‘Regime Change and Just War’, Dissent Magazine (Summer 2006) at
http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=663 (accessed on 14 April 2008).
3 M. Walzer, Arguing About War, pp171–91. Also ‘International Society: What is the best we can do?’
Paper number 8 http://www.sss.ias.edu/publications/papers/papereight.pdf, June 2000, p5. (accessed
on 14 April 2008). This article (an earlier draft) was also published in the Journal of the European
Ethics Network, Ethical Perspectives, December 1999. All references will be to the version published
in Arguing About War.
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assimilated the core elements of this essay we must ‘read back’ through Walzer’s
major works to seek theoretical consistency and that, if we do so, we find a
strikingly diﬀerent and vitally important message woven in to his account of
international justice.
Walzer on international justice: an unorthodox view
Walzer’s political prescriptions range from the consolidation of the Nation-State
system to a radical reform of International Society. Here I want to explore his
more radical claims, such as his claim that the past injustices of world politics (the
British Empire or American or Soviet aggression) should be repaid, perhaps by ‘far
reaching redistributions of wealth and resources’.4 I want to examine these claims
and see if there is one coherent theoretical underpinning that links them with his
more conventionalist claims concerning the right to self-determination and
inviolability of sovereignty; that is with the established body of his work.5 It is the
case that Walzer’s pronouncements have grown more ambitious over the years.
Indeed the tension between Walzer’s claim that ‘all in all, we cannot be happy with
the current state of the world’6 and the standard view of his work as strictly
conventionalist seems too much to ignore. It is certainly true of the more radical
aspect of Walzer’s work, as Orend notes, that:
[h]is most interesting and provocative contentions – like those concerning land transfers,
international alimony payments and pacific unions – are only briefly mentioned, and then
quickly set aside.7
Nevertheless with the publication of ‘Governing the Globe’ there is enough
consistency to his wish to reform International Society to warrant a serious
examination.
If we survey the range of Walzer’s work it seems that there is a tension between
the claim that international justice hinges on the proliferation of nation-states and
the expansion of the nation-states system and his more recent claim that the best
form of international society is characterised by what he terms ‘the third degree of
global pluralism’ which, ‘in its fully developed (ideal) version [. . .] oﬀers the largest
number of opportunities for political action on behalf of peace, justice, cultural
diﬀerence and individual rights’.8 This model incorporates national, regional and
global political structures and places a heavy emphasis on the weakening of
national sovereignty and the creation of ‘alternative centres’ capable of protecting
and encouraging political and social identity, encouraging, as Walzer puts it,
political possibility.9
4 M. Walzer, ‘Response’ in Miller and Walzer (eds), Pluralism Justice and Equality (Oxford, 1995),
p. 293.
5 M. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York: Basic
Books, 1977), Part Two.
6 Walzer, Arguing About War, p. 179.
7 Orend, Walzer on war and Justice, p. 176.
8 Walzer, Arguing About War, p. 186.
9 Ibid., p. 188.
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A progressive conventionalist
I do not want to challenge the more conservative image of Walzer’s political theory
fully. The image of Walzer the advocate of sovereign independence and non-
intervention in international aﬀairs is correct (as far as it goes). Nevertheless there
is another side to Walzer’s theory, a more progressive side that has always sat
uneasily with his conventionalist image. Without an adequate grasp of this side of
his work we cannot understand the impact of Walzer’s contribution to the most
important debates in contemporary international studies. My claim is that there is
firm theoretical consistency between these sides of Walzer’s work. My argument is
that the link between these contrasting views can be found in Walzer’s distinctive
approach to the issue of how universal political principles arise. The claim is not
that Walzer has always rested his account of just war or international justice on
a clear, distinctively particularist account of universalism. It is quite clear, for
example, that his early account of the development of international moral
principles, especially those politically urgent rights to life and liberty that underpin
the rules of disregard that ground his early defence of intervention, is based on a
problematically orthodox liberal-universalism. His claim that such rights are
‘somehow entailed by our sense of what it means to be a human being’10 was
ruthlessly targeted in the early critical debates that surrounded the publication of
Just and Unjust Wars. What is so important about these exchanges is the place they
have in the evolution of contemporary normative political and international theory.
The criticism of Walzer, especially by Beitz, Luban and Doppelt,11 and the
subsequent issue of Philosophy and Public Aﬀairs that allowed the argument to
develop12 set out the terms of the cosmopolitan/communitarian debate. Here the
inability of Walzer to justify his moral claims without seeming to rely on a
liberal-universalism led to a number of theoretical positions becoming deeply
entrenched in normative IR theory. The most important was that communitarians
cannot make coherent claims about universal human rights or the development of
international justice more generally. From this it followed that communitarians in
IR theory were statists, only methodologically distanced from the ranks of realists
that were the nemesis of normative judgment and that cosmopolitanism was the
only basis for a morally progressive IR theory. Walzer thus became identified with
a deeply conservative normative communitarianism. However despite the fact that
Walzer did not have the theoretical vocabulary to defend his position in these early
exchanges it is quite clear that his subsequent work developing a distinctively
particularist account of universalism is an important attempt to give voice to his
belief that communitarianism and universal moral principles are compatible.
My argument relies on a reconstruction of the trajectory of Walzer’s thought
from ‘The Moral Standing of States’ to ‘Governing the Globe’. The development
of key ideas through essays such as ‘Philosophy and Democracy’,13 ‘Liberalism and
10 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, p. 54.
11 See particularly G. Doppelt, ‘Walzer’s Theory of Morality in International Relations’, Philosophy
and Public Aﬀairs, 8:1 (1978), C. Beitz, ‘Bounded Morality: Justice and the State in World Politics’,
International Organization, 33:3 (Summer 1979), pp. 405–24 and D. Luban, ‘Just War and Human
Rights’, Philosophy and Public Aﬀairs, 9:2 (Winter 1980), pp. 161–81.
12 See M. Walzer, ‘The Moral Standing of States: A Response to Four Critics’ and articles by C. Beitz,
D. Luban and G. Doppelt in Philosophy and Public Aﬀairs, vols 8 and 9 (1980).
13 M. Walzer, ‘Philosophy and Democracy’, Political Theory, 9 (1981), pp. 379–99.
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the Art of Separation’,14 ‘The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism’,15 ‘Nation
and Universe’16 and Thick and Thin17 is vitally important to any understanding of
Walzer’s position. We need to take very seriously the link between Walzer’s
communitarianism and his account of universalism. For those of us interested in
the ethics of intervention this link manifests itself Walzer’s development of his
account of Jus ad Bellum to incorporate Jus ad Vim and his later argument in
favour of a radically redeveloped international political order. It allows us to really
understand why Walzer developed the ‘rules of disregard’ that legitimate some
interventions in Just and Unjust Wars and why he progressively relaxes the
principle of non-intervention throughout his career. For those of us interested in
IR theory more generally this link forces us to rethink the content of Walzer’s
communitarianism and provides the impetus to move normative theory beyond the
cosmopolitan/communitarian impasse. It tells us why we are mistaken to view
Walzer as an ultra-conservative normative communitarian and why we might
better think of him, in Adler’s rather useful terminology, as an ‘analytic
communitarian’, someone whose account of the development of universal moral
principles reinforces (rather than denies) the epistemological and ontological
importance of communities.18
For a political theorist interested in world politics Walzer’s argument is
immediately and intuitively engaging because it promises a universal theory that
can explain the appeal of moral particularism and the place of distinct (if not
discrete) political communities. Such an approach oﬀers to make sense of a world
in which we are all keenly aware that political sovereignty is both a much valued
and key element of world politics and one of the central reasons why we are not
making the major advances in international law and politics that the normative
discourse of international society requires. It is politically engaging because it
allows us to think about both universal justice (with its emphasis on human rights,
multilateralism, humanitarianism) and sovereignty (with its stress on pluralism,
self-determination and non-intervention). It is philosophically engaging because it
promises to retell the story of universalism in a way that claims to avoid the pitfalls
that beset much modern and virtually all cosmopolitan thinking. At both of these
points Walzer has been the object of much criticism. Walzer’s emphasis on the
necessity of particularist or communal ‘thickness’ to the everyday lives of the
world’s inhabitants and his subsequent defence of sovereignty and the principle of
non-intervention has led to accusations of moral and political conservatism (for
which read insensitivity) for over twenty-five years.19 Similarly the general view of
liberal and cosmopolitan critics has been that there is a marked lack of substantive
theory in Walzer’s work; that he did not, and could not, defend his conservatism
14 M. Walzer, ‘Liberalism and the Art of Separation’, Political Theory, 12 (1984), pp. 315–30.
15 M. Walzer, ‘The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism’, Political Theory, 18 (1990), pp. 6–23.
16 M. Walzer, ‘Nation and Universe’, in G. Petersen (ed.), TheTanner Lectures on Human Values XI,
1989 (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1990), p. 509.
17 M. Walzer, Thick and Thin: Moral Arguments at Home and Abroad (University of Notre Dame Press,
1994).
18 E. Adler, Communitarian International Relations: the Epistemic Foundations of International Relations
(London: Routledge, 2005), pp. 14–5.
19 For Walzer’s principal defence of non-intervention see M. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars. For a
representative sample of criticisms of this stance, see articles by C. Beitz, D. Liban and G. Poppelt
in Philosophy and Public Aﬀairs, vols 8 and 9, 1980.
International justice and the reform of global governance 517
or his occasional foray into universal (but very thin) human rights. Not only do
I think that the standard criticism of Walzer’s justificatory theory can be shown to
be wide of the mark but also that Walzer’s general theory is far more radical than
a conventionalist defence of the status quo. Indeed his apparent communitarianism
finds him one step away from the ideal of a pacific federation found in the Kantian
tradition.20 Despite Walzer’s own reticence in Thick and Thin, The Company of
Critics or Just and Unjust Wars21 it is the logic of his theory of ‘reiterative
universalism’ that has led him this way. In making these arguments I want to begin
to tease out the more radical side of Walzer’s theory. I think his radicalism goes
a long way beyond the moral minimum found in Thick and Thin or the
amendments to the ‘Legalist Paradigm’ in Just and Unjust Wars that limit a state’s
right to self-determination. Ultimately I want to suggest that the force of Walzer’s
IR theory requires that we begin to rethink the dominant norms of international
politics and ethics and the peremptory norms of international law (Jus Cogens).
Far from being a statist with a ‘sovereignty fixation’ Walzer oﬀers a vision of
international society that has to change to become more politically eﬀective and
more tolerant towards lives ‘without clear boundaries’.22
I am aware that this is an unusual reading of Walzer. I am, nevertheless,
convinced that the standard view of Walzer’s general theory does not tell the full
story. This view can be summarized by drawing on Orend’s excellent book Walzer
on War and Justice. He argues that:
[w]hile Walzer does not ignore questions of international justice in general, it is clear that
he does not devote much attention to them. Just war theory remains his overwhelming
focus in international aﬀairs. This is not, however, a mere diﬀerence in taste or relative
expertise: it is rooted in his conviction that war remains the most significant interaction
between states and so must be the main concern for theorists of international justice.23
I have no quarrel with Orend’s analysis as far as it goes (it was written before the
publication of the essay that forms the basis of this article and in fact it is one of
the few texts that explores the vital link between Walzer’s just war theory and the
moral theory laid out in Thick and Thin). However, Walzer has developed an
important general theory of international justice. Just war is no longer his
overwhelming focus in international aﬀairs as the legalist paradigm and the war
convention (however amended) are no longer the most relevant or adequate tools
in world politics. These tools are used to fight a rearguard action against the
break-up of the old order of world politics, a break up fostered by the actual
mobility of people, businesses and their problems and the inability of the sovereign
state system to deal adequately with this. Walzer acknowledges that war is still a
big part of world politics but war (at least the old-style national war) is no longer
the most significant interaction between states. On the back of these arguments
Walzer has begun to focus his attention on the reform of the international system
and the transcendence of the nation-state system.
20 The important thing to note here is that Walzer reaches this position by starting at the opposite end
of the theoretical continuum and still regards the position occupied by the cosmopolitans to be very
dangerous.
21 M. Walzer, Thick and Thin: Moral Arguments at Home and Abroad (University of Notre Dame Press,
1994). M. Walzer, The Company of Critics: Social Criticism and Social Commitment in the Twentieth
Century (Peter Halibran, 1989).
22 M. Walzer, On Toleration (Yale University Press, 1997), p. 87.
23 B. Orend, Walzer on War and Justice (Cardiﬀ: University of Wales Press, 2000), pp. 178–9.
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Just and unjust wars: Walzer and the first degree of global pluralism.
In his paper ‘Governing the Globe?’ Walzer presents us with the image of a
continuum of ideal types or models of international society.24
On this continuum our current situation is most accurately modelled by the first
degree of global pluralism, one step in from the right side and international
anarchy. This is also where we find the Walzer of Just and Unjust Wars, the
defender of non-intervention. Caricatured cosmopolitans favour a global state but
most cosmopolitans, such as Beitz and Pogge, tend to favour the federation model,
as did Kant.25 Interestingly both Beitz and Pogge will, when pushed, accept
something like the third degree of global pluralism model which is Walzer’s ideal
(in the sense of best).26 These opposing forces arrive at the same position from
diﬀerent sides of the continuum. This is not to say that any compromise is
automatically possible. While their political prescriptions may be similar their
disagreement at the level of theory is total. The cosmopolitans rely upon the strong
Kantian idea that interdependence triggers our dormant obligations to the rest of
humanity,27 a position that has philosophical diﬃculties and tends to push them
towards the stronger and, argues Walzer, more dangerous federative ideal.28 But
my point is that Walzer can be seen to share political ground with the
cosmopolitans.
This, of course, is quite some claim. Walzer is more usually thought of as a
defender of national self-determination, non-intervention and, most recently, a very
thin but universal ‘moral minimum’ that serves principally to justify Walzer’s
apparent communitarianism and statism. I have no quarrel with this as an
interpretation of the main body of Walzer’s work. However, if we explore the
character of his position here it becomes clear that the potential to move beyond
the nation-state system was always present.
24 Walzer, Arguing About War, p. 186.
25 I. Kant, Perpetual Peace and other essays in Politics, History and Morals, translated by T. Humphrey
(Indianapolis: Hacket, 1983).
26 See, for example, Pogge’s vertical dispersment of sovereignty in ‘Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty’,
Ethics, 103 (October 1992), pp. 48–75.
27 See my discussion of the cosmopolitanism of Beitz and Pogge in P. Sutch, Ethics, Justice and
International Relations: Constructing an International Community (London, New York: Routledge,
2001), ch.2.
28 Walzer, Arguing About War, p. 184.
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The key to understanding the potential in Walzer’s theory is the idea of
reiteration, which finds its fullest expression in Thick and Thin. The idea of
reiteration, or reiterative universalism, is extremely important in Walzer’s moral
theory as it is the vehicle by which we move (albeit temporarily in Walzer’s first
instalment of his IR theory) from particularism to universalism and therefore from
international anarchy to the first degree of global pluralism. It is also the concept
that leads him in his most recent work to argue for what he calls the third degree
of global pluralism. Reiterative universalism can most readily be understood if we
contrast it with covering-law universalism (and here covering law universalism is
what we usually refer to when we talk of universalism). The reiterative way in
which we arrive at the formulation of the universal law is distinctly communitarian.
We abstract from the particular to the universal through repeated experience of
shared political problems. Walzer argues, ‘perhaps the end product of this eﬀort
will be a set of standards to which all societies can be held – negative injunctions,
most likely, rules against murder, deceit, torture, oppression, and tyranny’.29 This
all sounds very optimistic but Walzer’s initial position is not so up beat. He argues
that the very thing that allows us to form these minimalist positions necessarily
prevents them from developing into maximalist ones.
[r]eiterative universalism can always be given a covering-law form [. . .] But these are
covering laws of a special sort: first, they are learned from experience, through a historical
engagement with otherness [. . .] second, because they are learned in this way they impose
upon us a respect for particularity.30
Walzer does not believe that all agents make ‘thick’ or sustained assumptions and
so his conclusions are casuistical rather than transcendental. In essence he argues
that we do make such globalist assumptions but only in the context of
international political crises and that we do not go on to incorporate these
assumptions into the moral hierarchy of our everyday lives. The character of
international society and the way we (as citizens of sovereign states) confront each
other in the international sphere have historically limited the eﬀectiveness of the
reiterative process.
International Society, writes Walzer, is the most tolerant of all forms of
society.31 This is not an expression of admiration but rather a consequence of the
‘good fences make good neighbours’ thesis.
Sovereignty guarantees that no one on that side of the border can interfere with what is
done on this side. The people over there might be resigned, indiﬀerent, curious, or
enthusiastic with regard to practices over here, and so may be disinclined to interfere. Or
perhaps they accept the reciprocal logic of sovereignty: we won’t worry about your
practices if you don’t worry about ours. Live and let live is a relatively easy maxim when
the living is done on the opposite side of a clearly marked line. Or they may be actively
hostile, eager to denounce their neighbour’s culture and customs, but unprepared to pay
the costs of interference. Given the nature of international society, the costs are likely to be
high: They involve raising an army, crossing a border, killing and being killed.32
29 Walzer, Thick and Thin, p. 10.
30 Walzer, ‘Nation and Universe’, p. 515.
31 Walzer, ‘The Politics of Diﬀerence: Statehood and Toleration in a Multicultural World’ Ratio Juris,
10:2 (1997), p. 168. First published in R. McKim and J. McMahan (eds), The Morality of
Nationalism (Oxford University Press, 1997).
32 Walzer, On Toleration, pp. 19–20.
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International justice is not a Universalist ethic in the traditional sense. It is a
product of recognition of a multiplicity of claims to justice as a series of family
resemblances, a distillation of what it means to have a claim to justice. It is a
consensus on a minimalist position that is not suﬃcient to guide our lives but that
recognises each family resemblance for what it is, a glimpse of oneself in a totally
separate ‘other’.
We stand where we are and learn from our encounters with other people. What we learn is
that we have no special standing; the claims that we make they make too [. . .] But it is a
moral act to recognise otherness this way. If reiteration is, as I believe, a true story, then it
carries in its telling the sorts of moral limits that are usually said only to come from
covering-law universalism.33
Nevertheless it is important to note ‘that what is recognised is just this (partial)
commonality, not the full moral significance of the other cultures. Most people
most of the time do not see the others, in context, as carriers of value; most people
are not pluralists’.34 For Walzer cultural pluralism is a part of ‘a thickly developed
liberal politics’. Reiterative universalism in this first stage of the development of
international society relies on something much weaker, on ‘overlapping expecta-
tions’ about the behaviour of others.35
Walzer argues that in the contemporary international system ‘rights are only
enforceable within political communities where they have been collectively recog-
nised . . . the globe is not, or is not yet, such an arena. Or rather the only global
community is pluralist in character, a community of nations, not of humanity.’36
Yet for Walzer the concept of individual rights is also central to the minimalist
morality created in response to the problems of international relations. These
values are not good in themselves. Walzer argues that ‘the value of minimalism lies
in the encounters it facilitates, of which it is also the product. But these encounters
are not – not now, at least-suﬃciently sustained to produce a thick morality.’37
Nevertheless Walzer believes that they both do important work in international
politics. We develop a reiteratively universal standpoint to judge them from, a
perspective from which a global ethics is a possibility and from where the right of
sovereign powers to go to war or to act in certain ways towards their citizens in
the name of Raison d’état is limited. If, at this point, we read Walzer’s later insight
back into his earlier work we must recognise that it is on this basis that Walzer
develops the six propositions and five revisions that make up the Legalist Paradigm
and later, in Thick and Thin, states his case for the centrality of a ‘thin’ version of
human rights. Interpreting his struggle to reconcile universalism and particularism
in this way and viewing it as his response to the early criticisms of his ethical
theory, provides a compelling reason to review his early argument and oﬀers the
basis for a critical grasp of his most recent work.
These rules are constructed from within our social context and while they may
be framed as ‘covering-laws’ they are historically conditioned and certainly not
suﬃcient to mould a maximalist account of international ethics. The rights to life
33 Walzer, ‘Nation and Universe’, p. 527.
34 Walzer, Thick and Thin, p. 17.
35 Ibid.
36 Walzer, ‘The Moral Standing of States: A Response to Four Critics’, in Philosophy and Public
Aﬀairs, 9:18 (1980), p. 222.
37 Walzer, Thick and Thin, pp. 18–19.
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and liberty are, however, based on a commonly held perception (or a family of
perceptions) of what it means to be a human being. Nations (domestically) and
states (in the international sphere) are products of moral and political reasoning
and producers of moral and political reason, the fount of our understandings of
the moral reality of international politics. In an uncharacteristically optimistic
moment Walzer outlines the full range and derivation of his international theory
and it is worth quoting him at some length here:
These two arguments-first for what might be called the moral usefulness of the
(nation-)state and the solidarity it generates, and second for the possible legitimacy of the
citizenship/ethnicity or citizenship/culture connection-do not commit those who accept them
to resign themselves to the ‘drastic inequalities’ of international society. They only require
that the fight against those inequalities begin within existing political communities and that
it aim at the progressive expansion, but not the abolition, of existing solidarities [. . .] They
embody [. . .] the admission of refugees to full citizenship; increased foreign aid, economic
unification, and cooperation across borders; multilateral political, and if necessary, military
interventions for humanitarian purposes; extensions of sovereignty to stateless persons;
experiments in regional devolution and transnational agency. And the motive for all this
can only be the hope of ordinary people in their diverse national, religious, and political
communities for their own survival and well being, and for that of their neighbours, under
conditions of peace and justice.38
Walzer’s method does not have the capacity to demand these reforms in world
politics but he is suggesting that these actions are already considered a part of the
necessary framework for international survival and well-being. His reiterative
universalism is intended to describe the basic reasons that can be given for this
recognition and Walzer’s optimism grows in his most recent work.
Despite this optimism Walzer is still firmly of the opinion that international
society is still limited to this first degree of global pluralism. The nation-state (or
religious republic) is where and how most groups would prefer to be tolerated.
Peoples, particularly those who are under threat, culturally or politically, aim for
sovereignty ‘with governments, armies, and borders, co-existing with other
nation-states in mutual respect.’39 For those seeking a kind of political sanctuary
this makes historical and political sense. But for those of us who seek international
justice the current organisation of international society causes more problems than
it solves. This tension is not just a tension in Walzer’s theory; it is not Walzer the
communitarian theorist versus Walzer the bleeding heart academic. This tension
characterises our experience of world politics. What Walzer oﬀers is a case for the
development of international society beyond the nation-state system (and beyond
the UN system of international politics that is not so far removed from this model)
that recognises the appeal of national sovereignty as well as its intrinsic dangers.
The crux of the issue can be set out as follows. We have learned that we must
respect the integrity of sovereign peoples yet we have also learned, or at the very
least are beginning to learn, that sovereignty necessarily establishes illegitimate
moral and political boundaries. It is often the case that the intolerable is, by
structurally encouraged act and omission, tolerated in international society.
38 M. Walzer, ‘Response to Veit Bader’, Political Theory, 23:2 (1995), p. 249. Here Walzer is
responding to Bader’s demand for large scale economic redistribution and open borders.
39 Walzer, ‘The Politics of Diﬀerence’, p. 168.
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Walzer recognised this problem early on in his career and this is why the issues
surrounding intervention have been so important to him. I do not want to explore
Walzer’s theory of legitimate intervention here. His views here are well known and,
in any case, such an exploration would take us away from our principal concern
in this article. What I do wish to examine is Walzer’s understanding of the
constitutive norms of international society that once prioritised strict adherence to
the principle of self-determination (as a matter of practical ethics) but now criticise
such prioritisation. The moral problem that seems to weigh heavily upon
contemporary world politics is that while:
[a]cts or practices that “shock the conscience of mankind” are, in principle not tolerated
[. . .] Humanitarian intolerance is not usually suﬃcient to override the risks that
intervention entails, and additional reasons for intervening – whether geopolitical,
economic, or ideological – are only sometimes available.40
It is the weakness of international political structures in the face of reiteratively estab-
lished norms, or thin, minimalist principles that leads Walzer to advocate a renovated
international society capable of supporting the third degree of global pluralism.
Reiterated norms and the case for the third degree of global pluralism.
Characteristically Walzer’s reiterated moral minimum is very thin. Essentially this
is because Walzer was so wary of the intellectual hegemon that is liberal
cosmopolitanism and the ‘tyrannical potential’ of powerful political regimes who
oﬀer aid in return for imitation. This concern is still a significant part of Walzer’s
thinking and the reason why he resists all pressure from the left side of his
continuum of international societal models.41 The key to Walzer’s new inter-
national relations theory, his argument in favour of finding political expression for
a sustained moral minimum (a major move away from the typical Walzerian
position), lies in the reiterated recognition that the nation-states system simply
cannot deal appropriately with the crises it faces. The system has come under
sustained pressure from all sides. It is clear to us that the existing system of
semi-impervious political boundaries is unhelpful. Border disputes, wars of
secession, civil wars, ethnic cleansing; these are very familiar consequences of the
current division of the world’s territories. We might not know what to do about
Rwanda, Eastern Europe or Palestine but we are aware that the nation-building
projects that have forged these conflicts are part of the problem rather than part
of the solution. From the opposite direction the globalisation of the world’s
economy and migration, in all its political and economic forms, is calling into
question the utility and the justice of the nation-state system. Again, the issues are
huge but we can be sure that nation-building (in both the territorial sense and the
sense in which Kymlica articulates the formation of national identity)42 is
unhelpful. That this is a position that can be ascribed to Walzer would
undoubtedly come as a shock to many of Walzer’s critics.
40 Walzer, On Toleration, p. 21.
41 Walzer, Arguing About War, pp. 184–5
42 See, for example, Kymlica and Opalski (eds), Can Liberal Pluralism be Exported? Western Political
Theory and Ethnic relations in Eastern Europe (Oxford University Press, 2001), ch.1.
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Let me unpack this last paragraph a little. The concept that is doing all the
work here is still moral reiteration. The way that Walzer presented this idea in
Thick and Thin stressed the temporary and casuistical nature of the moral
minimum. We make urgent moral judgments in times of great crisis. Over time we
develop a stock of reiterated judgments that we use to deal with each crisis as it
arises. However we do not incorporate such judgments into the thick moral fabric
of our everyday lives. The reason we do not incorporate these judgments into our
moral maximalisms stems from two inter-related roots. Firstly we are only called
upon to make these universal moral judgments in unusual circumstances. The most
sustained range of international judgments we make have related to the just cause
and conduct of war. The relative thickness of the legalist paradigm and the war
convention stand as testimony to this.43 The decisions we make here are relevant
only to an extreme situation and are therefore of limited use to us in the conduct
of our everyday lives. Even the very thin universal moral principles, ‘the right to
life and liberty’ upon which the legalist paradigm is predicated find better
expression in our separate moral maximalisms.
[t]he minimal demands we make on one another are, when denied, repeated with passionate
insistence. In moral discourse, thinness and intensity go together, whereas with thickness
comes qualification, compromise, complexity and disagreement.44
The reason these principles find better expression in our thick everyday lives is
related to the second point. The political context in which we make these decisions
is very diﬀerent from the context in which we live our everyday lives. Historically
we have chosen to value our separate ways of life by privileging the principles of
sovereignty and non-intervention and the sorts of moral and political judgments we
make in international politics are contorted to fit this model. Again we would make
diﬀerent and more eﬀective decisions in our everyday lives, decisions that simply
could not be entertained in international politics. But this is changing. Or at least
this is what Walzer must be claiming if his new IR theory is to hold water. The
sorts of crisis that we find intolerable and impelled to act upon are becoming (or
have become) a fixture in our political lives and the political constitution of
international society has adapted to the point where the basic assumptions of
sovereignty, non-intervention, self-determination and of the anarchical society do
not make sense of our moral and political commitments. In short, we have
reiterated and shared reasons for needing to change the shape of world politics.
The key interpretative claim that I am making here is that the temporary,
casuistical and reiterative process of norm construction has itself developed as the
constitutive context of world politics has changed. The underpinning of Walzer’s
most ambitious essay suggests that these thin moral universals have become, or are
becoming, freestanding – a part of our ‘common human reason’ providing
autonomous moral reasons that transcend their origins.45 The suggestion is that
this marks the evolution of Walzer’s particularist account of universalism rather
43 See Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, especially chapters 3 and 4.
44 Walzer, Thick and Thin, p. 6.
45 The phrase is David Reidy’s see D. Reidy, ‘Political Authority and Human Rights’ in R. Martin and
D. Reidy (eds), Rawls’s Law of Peoples: A Realistic Utopia? (Blackwell, 2006), ch. 10. I would
particularly like to thank a reader for Review of International Studies for generous and critical
comments that led to me presenting the argument this way.
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than a departure from it and oﬀers vital lessons for a communitarian account of
international ethics.
An argument of this sort would not, I think, be a new departure for Walzer.
Indeed I think he underplayed the potential of the reiterative process in his earlier
work. He underplayed its potential because he wanted to highlight the fact that we
need to let it happen in its own time. Forcing the issue corrupts the reiterative
process. The image of the social critic in Walzer’s earlier work is that of a person
who is ‘hanging in there’46 waiting for the appropriate moment to steer
international society towards a brighter future. For Walzer this is the pattern that
political morality takes.
If principles determine decisions, decisions in turn modify and refine principles: This is the
way that both law and morality change over time. And in this process it is not only the
judgment of authoritative decisions that count but [the judgment of all citizens].47
Walzer’s claim must be that now the time is right to begin to steer international
society towards a new political constitution. This claim is predicated on a reading
of international politics that claims that the way the peoples of the world confront
one another in this now politicised arena has changed significantly over time. Most
importantly Walzer’s argument is that neither the nation-state (the most intolerant
of all societal structures)48 nor international society as currently constituted (the
most tolerant) are practical or just enough for our contemporary international
political needs. This argument must be predicated on the claim that our thin,
reiteratively universal understanding of human rights to life and liberty has
thickened up in significant ways to become a key part of our moral justificatory
framework.
Statehood and toleration in a multicultural world.
For Walzer the modern project can be characterised as the search for ‘collective
toleration’, which incorporates a struggle for boundaries.
The crucial slogan of this struggle is ‘self determination’, which implies the need for a piece
of territory or, at least, a set of independent institutions – hence, decentralization,
devolution, autonomy, partition, sovereignty. Getting the boundaries right, not only in
geographic but also in functional terms, is enormously diﬃcult, but it is necessary if the
diﬀerent groups are to exercise significant control over their own lives and to do so with
some security.49
The key to this project, and the key to all of Walzer’s political theory up until his
most recent work, is the need to recognise that membership in specific groups is the
basis of life in a diﬀerentiated world. In this model the nation-state is the core unit.
The nation-building projects that fostered this development have given this, the
most intolerant of political structures, the central role in our domestic lives and
have also given rise to the nation-state system in international politics which
46 Walzer, The Company of Critics, p. 229.
47 Walzer, Thick and Thin, p. 101.
48 Walzer, On Toleration, pp. 24–30.
49 Walzer, ‘The Politics of Diﬀerence’, p. 175.
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Walzer characterises as the most tolerant (indeed as far too tolerant). As the key
to Walzer’s ‘communitarianism’ and as the key to a description of how modern
politics has developed I find this position compelling. However just as compelling
is Walzer’s claim that both the intolerance of the nation-state and the super-
tolerance of the nation-state system of international politics have outlived their
usefulness; that the modern project is drawing, or should be drawing to a close.
This argument rests on a strong claim about the ways in which we confront
others at a national, regional and international level. At the national level states
are increasingly coming under pressure from within and pressure from without.
From the inside the disturbingly random way in which geopolitical boundaries
have been drawn has led to secessionist movements and ethnic conflict. From the
outside immigrant pressure, from the fall-out from these conflicts and from the
increased economic need for mobility, has, Walzer suggests, led to the increasing
recognition that the nation-state has practical limitations. It seems that intolerance
has become, in many vital ways, intolerable. Non-intervention makes no sense in
light of our intolerance towards ethnic cleansing. Nation-building (again in
Kymlica’s sense which Walzer adopts for his description)50 makes no sense of, or
rather cannot make full sense of, our experience of the world.
In immigrant Societies (and also now in nation-states under immigrant pressure), people
experience what we might think of as a life without boundaries and without secure or
singular identities. Diﬀerence is, as it were, dispersed, so that it is encountered everywhere,
everyday. The hold of groups on their members is looser than it has ever been. And the
result is a constant intermixing of individuals, intermarriage, and a literal multiculturalism,
instantiated not only in the society as a whole but in each and every individual. Now
tolerance begins at home, where we often have to make ethnic, religious, and cultural peace
with our spouses, in-laws, and children – and with our own ambiguous (hyphenated or
divided) selves.51
This blurring of the basic principles of national membership has developed
alongside repeated or reiterated encounters with a burgeoning international society.
In dealing with refugee crises, or catastrophes such as the Kosovo conflict, or a
rapidly developing international civil society, we have developed ‘a plurality of
international political and financial organisations, with a kind of authority that
limits but does not abolish sovereignty.’52 An international society with nation-
states existing next to international organisations such as the UN, the World Bank,
the IMF and the WTO is familiar to us all as are its limitations. As Walzer
notes:
The global organisations are weak; their decision making mechanisms are uncertain or
slow; their powers of enforcement are diﬃcult to bring to bear and, at best, only partially
eﬀective. Warfare between or among states has been reduced but overall violence has not
been reduced. There are many weak, divided, and unstable states in the world today, and
the global regime has not been successful in preventing civil wars, military interventions,
savage repression of political enemies, massacred and ethnic cleansing aimed at minority
populations. Nor has global inequality been reduced.53
50 Walzer, ‘Nation-States and Immigrant Societies’ in Kymlica and Opalski (eds), Can Liberal Pluralism
be Exported, pp. 150–3.
51 Walzer, ‘The Politics of Diﬀerence’, p. 175.
52 Walzer, Arguing About War, p. 182.
53 Ibid., p. 179.
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The reiterated facts of international politics are that the globalist institutions of
international society are too weak and that retreat into the nation-state is not the
solution. With these reiterations come others. The ‘ultra-minimal’ rights to life and
liberty arose through repeated encounters with separate ‘others’ in world politics.
We did not incorporate any ‘thick’ understanding of these rights in our moral
maximalisms because of the way they arose. It seems that this minimalist
universalism found its best expression in a very thin account of human rights in IR
and, in a vast plurality of ways, in our separate moral maximalisms. But the logic
of the reiterative process does not stop here. Once established in the moral
consciousness of international society these principles become more than the
recognition of some ‘partial commonality’ in a totally separate ‘other’; they become
a critical tool. The consequence of this is that we come to recognise that our thin,
but intensely important, moral minimum no longer finds adequate expression in
membership of a sovereign nation-state in a loose international society.
Walzer’s theoretical and political shift to globalism and universalism is
extraordinary. But we must not over-egg the pudding. It must be noted that this
reiterative process is not simply a matter of unilinear progress. What Walzer calls,
somewhat guardedly, his post-modern project has not superseded the modern
project. Rather:
The one is superimposed on the other, without in any way obliterating it. There are still
boundaries but they are blurred by all the crossings. We still know ourselves to be this or
that, but the knowledge is uncertain, for we are also this and that. Strong identity groups
exist and assert themselves politically, but the allegiance of their members is measured by
degrees, along a broad continuum, with larger and larger numbers clustered at the farther
end (which is why the militants at the near end are so strident these days).54
The argument is not that we have abandoned the categories of international
relations, or that we universally acknowledge that the values of membership,
sovereignty and non-intervention are now defunct. While the ‘solid lines on the old
cultural and political maps are turned into dotted lines [. . .] coexistence along and
across those lines is still a problem.’55 But Walzer’s universal morality does, he
argues, oﬀer arguments that underwrite an international society that ‘would bring
many of the advantages of a global federation but with greatly reduced risk of
tyranny from the centre.’56 To appreciate the monumental shift in Walzer’s
political argument, consider the following description of his ideal form of
international society:
So the third degree of global pluralism requires a United Nations with a military force of
its own capable of humanitarian interventions and a strong version of peacekeeping – but
still a force that can only be used with the approval of the Security Council or a very large
majority of the General Assembly. Then it requires a World Bank and IMF strong enough
to regulate the flow of capital and the forms of international investment and a World Trade
Organization able to enforce labor and environmental standards – all these, however,
independently governed, not tightly coordinated with the UN. It requires a World Court
with power to make arrests on its own, but needing to seek UN support in the face of
opposition from any of the (semi-sovereign) states of international society. Add to these
organizations a very large number of civic associations operating internationally, including
54 Walzer, ‘The Politics of Diﬀerence’, p. 175.
55 Ibid., p. 176.
56 Walzer, Arguing About War, p. 186.
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political parties that run candidates in diﬀerent countries’ elections and labor unions that
begin to realize their longstanding goal of international solidarity, as well as single-issue
movements aiming to influence simultaneously the UN and its agencies and the diﬀerent
states. The larger the membership of these associations and the wider their extension across
state boundaries, the more they would knit together the politics of the global society. But
they would never constitute a single centre; they would always represent multiple sources of
political energy; they would always be diversely focused.
Now add a new layer of governmental organization – the regional federation, of which
the European Community is only one possible model. We can imagine both tighter and
looser structures (but tighter is probably better for the control of global markets and
multinational corporations), distributed across the globe, perhaps even with overlapping
memberships: diﬀerently constituted federal unions in diﬀerent parts of the world. 57
The key, for Walzer, is ‘to create a set of alternative centres and an increasingly
dense set of social ties that cross state boundaries’.58
Conclusion
The purpose of this article is to suggest that the way in which Walzer reaches his
conclusions, the way he is able to deal with the changing circumstances of
international politics, oﬀers more to current debates than is usually acknowledged.
His particularist universalism oﬀers a genuine and important alternative to
covering-law or liberal universalism in international ethics. It is important because
it oﬀers a place to moral and cultural pluralism and to universal morality. It is not
the case that we can have either globalism or cultural and political diversity. With
Walzer we can have both. Walzer’s ‘reiterative universalism’ is one of the most
promising theories within the particularist tradition of moral and political
philosophy. In a world characterised by a multiplicity of ethno-cultural traditions
that are expressed in wide variety of social contexts we are much better placed to
understand what has happened and what should happen in international politics if
we think about universalism in reiterative terms. As Walzer puts it ‘why should we
value human agency if we are unwilling to give it any room for manoeuvre and
invention’.59 Understanding that the development of universal moral and legal
principles entails a respect for key aspects of community and sovereignty really
oﬀers a way through the impasse that has characterised much contemporary
normative IR theory.
There is another reason for thinking again about Walzer’s account of universal
justice and that is the way in which his political theory has the ability to connect
to debates in international studies. One of the key debates about the future of
global governance concerns the ways in which we want international law to
structure international politics. Do we want the UN to be able to police restrictions
on the use of force more adequately? Do we want the Security Council to develop
our collective capacity for humanitarian intervention? Do we want the Inter-
national Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court to have compulsory
jurisdiction? Do we want to hold all world organisations up to human rights
57 Walzer, Arguing About War p. 187–8.
58 Ibid., p. 186.
59 Walzer, ‘Nation and Universe’, p. 523.
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standards? Or, conversely, do we want to limit the remit of international law and
institutions to preserve the sovereignty of states? These are moral questions but
they are also political and thus legal and institutional questions. The legal and
political debates are cast in terms of developing norms,60 institutional and legal
process61 and the relevance of soft law.62 Walzer’s normative theory can connect
to these debates in a way that cosmopolitanism (despite the best eﬀorts of
Fernando Teson and Allen Buchanan)63 cannot. The institutional and legal debates
have been working to recapture the normative side of these key debates (much in
the same way that IR has returned to the consideration of ethical issues in recent
years) and Walzer’s theory also has the potential to connect with and augment the
normative element of constructivist IR theory. In Walzer’s account of the
reiterative social construction of moral norms that reinforces ‘a respect for
particularity’ we find important links with Adler’s recognition that:
Constructivsm is not only a sociological critique of rational choice approaches or a
synonym for norm-oriented research, but also the epistemological and ontological
foundation of a reformulated IR ‘communitarian’ approach. This approach does not herald
the end of the nation-state or underscore the unimportance of individuals and agency in
international life. Rather, it argues that what mediates between state, individuals, and
human agency on the one hand, and social structures and systems, on the other, are
communities of practise. (Adler 2005:14–15)
Walzer, while oﬀering an account of international justice that is, as we have see,
progressive, allows his moral theory to speak the same language as those who
normative theory needs to address if we are to make any real progress.
The purpose of presenting the more progressive side of Walzer’s political theory
is not merely to raise academic eyebrows or to deny the importance of Walzer’s
contribution to just war theory. Indeed the reason why Walzer’s account of the
principles of just war theory is so important is precisely because it is not merely
a description of the status quo. His views on the military ethics are linked to his
broader account of human rights and international justice. The reason that the
liberals who championed human rights discourses as an alternative to the
casuistical language of just war theory criticised him so heavily was that they could
not see this link. The simple fact is that international politics needs both and any
60 See the work of social constructivists such as M. Finnemore and K. Sikkink, ‘International Norm
Dynamics and Political Change’, International Organization, 52 (1998), pp. 887–917, J. Brunee and
S. Toope, ‘International Law and Constructivism: Towards and Interactional Theory of Law’,
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 39:19 (2000), or F. Kratochwil, Rules, Norms and Decisions:
On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Aﬀairs
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
61 See liberal institutional theory such as A. Slaughter, ‘A Liberal Theory of International Law’
Proceedings of the American Society of International Law’, 94 (2000), or R. Keohane, Power and
Governance in a Partially Globalized World (London, New York: Routledge 2002), and the second
wave of legal process theory led by H. Koh, ‘Why do Nations Obey’, Yale Law Journal, (1996),
p. 2599.
62 The place of norms that are part of legal discourse but not formally law is found in much legal
theory and in a range of traditions and it is here that Walzer has much to oﬀer. See, for example,
C.Chinkin, ’The challenge of soft law:Development and change in International Law, International
and Comparative Law Quarterly, 38:4 (1989), pp. 850–66 or K. Abbot and D. Snidal, ‘Hard and Soft
Law in International Governance’, International Organization, 54 (2000) pp. 421–56.
63 F. Teson, A Philosophy of International Law (Westview Press, 1998), A. Buchanan, Justice,
Legitimacy and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations of International Law (Oxford University
Press, 2004).
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theory that sees them as mutually exclusive is not fit for purpose. Walzer, I have
argued, can provide both and speak of human rights and global justice to actors
who still cherish sovereignty but are tentatively engaging in the discourses of
humanitarianism and justice.
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